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THAT THE PEOPLE MAY BE FED: DROUGHT 
AND FAMINE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 1991-1993
By Reginald Herbold Green
The Summer is past.
The harvest is gathered.
And we are not saved.
- Jeremiah 
I.
The Apocalypse Drought
Over 1991-92 the main rains faltered or failed along the Indian Ocean coast 
of Africa from the Cape to Cairo with the exception of northern Mozambique 
and Tanzania. On the Atlantic side, the drought stretched through Namibia 
into southern Angola. For the Southern African Development Conference 
region and for eight of its ten member States it was the worst drought 
leading to the worse crop out-turn in living memory.
The folk-saying of the people of Gaza Province in Mozambique "When the 
great river runs dry, the end of the world is at hand" became searing 
reality as, for most of its course from Beitbridge to the Indian Ocean the 
great Limpopo River was reduced to remnant puddles or trickles and dried, 
cracked mud flats. Other major rivers dwindled to 10% to 30% of normal 
flows and by October two major cities - Beira and Bulawayo - were on the 
verge of complete drying up of water supply and limited flows through hydro 
power stations created severe electricity shortages from Tanzania through 
Zimbabwe. Hundreds of thousands of rural people had been forced from their 
homes, desperate forced migrants in search of water.
For Southern Africa estimated grain out-turn as of April was 56% of 
'normal' (Table 1). Excluding Angola and Tanzania it was 35%. Even 
allowing for slightly less draconic loss of some other crops (e.g. cassava, 
plantains but not oil seeds) and somewhat better actual out-turns in 
northern Mozambique and Tanzania, the spectre of famine leaps from the
2figures. This is especially the case because 'normal' refers to 1987/91, 
so for Mozambique and Angola is a war scorched, sub-survival level base.
The impact of the drought has been worsened by the context in which it 
occurred. Economic unsuccess and war debilitated the major Southern 
African states throughout the 1980s. The very real 1986-91 recovery with 
gross domestic product and food production growth exceeding that of 
population regionally and for most countries, was also and is fragile. In 
war ravaged Angola and Mozambique, the pre-drought food deficit (after 
imports) stood around 25% of national needs. With drought losses the 
Mozambique deficit would, in the absence of additional food aid, have risen 
to 45% in rural areas and 43% overall. The underlying causal factor is 
that of the order of 50% of the total Angolan and Mozambican populations 
are refugees, domestic forced migrants or pauperised in place among the 
ruins of their farms and homes in combat zones. The parallel is that 
infrastructure destruction makes rapid movement of relief food hard to 
impossible - especially if there are breakdowns or violations of the peace 
process.
Perhaps because the drought was so major, national, regional and FAO/WFP 
early warning systems performed adequately to well. By November 1991 they 
indicated danger of disaster (very late and inadequate rains), by January 
impending disaster (barring miraculous late rains), by March full scale 
disaster on an unprecedented scale. That is as early as the weather/crop 
cycle allows warnings to come.
But the passing on of the warnings until February was not equally prompt or 
clear. The FAO/WFP reports contained them but in such a low key as not to 
strike home to readers what was happening. The SADC (then SADCC) Food 
Security Unit's incomplete regional warning of actual disaster came in 
February parallel to national alarms from Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique and 
Zambia. By March an independent estimate of over 5,000,000 tonnes 
additional (about 6,000,000 to 6,250,000 total allowing for 1991/92 extra 
regional imports) food imports and at least 3,500,000 tonnes additional 
food aid requirements (4,500,000 gross when added to the 1991/92 base) had 
been made. The later FAO/WFP Mission Report conclusion was that total 
imports needed to be 6,743,000 tonnes and food aid 4,363,000 tonnes 
(Table 2).
3Technically the early warning system worked well. Practically no stand by 
alarm went out in December and no alarm in January. As a result the 
FAO/WFP Mission was brought forward from June to April rather than from 
June to February/March as would have been fully justified on January data.
II.
The response from March through June was unusually prompt and energetic.
The April FAO/WFP Mission, drawing on other UN Agency field staff 
(especially UNICEF in respect to water) documented the magnitude of the 
1992 crop failure and 1992/93 famine potential with 18,000,000 people 
deprived of the means to produce or to buy food. The speed and detail with 
which it was able to do this was in large part the result of the national 
and regional early warning and calamity (natural disaster) and catastrophe 
(man made disaster - i.e. war) response mechanisms as well as of support 
from international NGOs and bilateral donors.
The parameters of need set out for the June 1992 Geneva Southern African 
Appeal conference co-sponsored by the United Nations and SADCC (now SADC) 
included (Table 3):
1. 4,843,000 tonnes of food aid (2,313,000 tonnes Emergency) or 3,566,000 
above levels previously pledged for 1992/93 before the extent of the 
drought became known;
2. approximately $437 million of net additional support for transport and 
distribution; water, and the non-food costs of camps and works 
programmes less pre-conference pledges and potential additional 
monetisation of additional food aid for urban sale.
Pledges appear to have totalled about 60% of both physical and financial 
targets but with water and rehabilitation (tools/agriculture) under 20% of 
targets. Exact levels are hard to work out because some previously 
committed food aid and some quasi commercial soft loan food for resale were 
not committed while in certain cases additional general balance of payments 
support cash grants were made in the disaster context.
4In retrospect - apart from the dangerously low pledge level - six 
weaknesses stand out:
1. underestimation of and inadequate information on national and regional 
as well as on domestic NGO capacity by the United Nations family 
leading to a lower than possible degree of coordination and joint 
planning;
2. serious underestimation, both nationally and internationally (followed 
by even more serious underpledging) of the drinking water crisis 
confronting many people in the region;
3. failure to create an overall mechanism to track turning of pledges into 
commitments and especially into a dated delivery schedule with a view 
to achieving a rapid and predictable flow;
4. underestimation of Angola's emergency needs - flowing largely from war 
not drought - resulting in unrealistically low import and aid 
estimates;
5. the over 2,000,000 tonnes (about 700,000 for Zimbabwe) of food 
implicitly targeted for commercial importation out of drought stricken 
states' own foreign exchange earnings which was dangerously high in 
terms of their external balance constraints and domestic fiscal 
fragility;
6. inadequate attention to Tanzania's fiscal problem resulting from 
northern and southern domestic surpluses available to meet central and 
northwestern deficits but in a context of severe national budget 
constraints whose breaching would (presumably does) threaten IMF/World 
Bank support for its relatively successful Structural Adjustment 
Programme.
The March-June mobilisation was relatively rapid and well designed while 
the pledging response was above average for major recent emergency appeals. 
But the euphoria - especially internationally - after the conference was 
ill-founded. The pledges were not adequate and - given the normal 3 to 8 
month lag from pledges to delivery combined with the very low harvest out­
turn - were likely to arrive too late to avert famine especially in 
Mozambique. In two cases war and its aftermath was certain (even if actual
5fighting ended by October/November as it did in Mozambique) to limit 
distribution capacity.
III.
Contrary to June hopes, the pledges/requirements gap did not close after 
the conference. As of October, total food pledges in physical terms were 
about 60% of target - 80% for emergency but under 50% for other (i.e. food 
for resale in urban areas and food for work) food aid. Water, toolB and 
agriculture remained grossly underfunded (little over 10% on some 
estimates).
The country breakdown was even more alarming especially in the cases of 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Angola. Mozambique pledges totalled only 54% of 
target (740,000 of 1,360,000). While one reason was doubts as to 
distributional capacity, this was in part circular. Inadequate cash 
pledges to logistics and failure to move promptly to contract hire more 
private hauliers (as the government desired and as the rapid reduction of 
war risk facilitated) played a large part in the absorption capacity 
constraint as did the national decapacitation resulting from fragmented, 
multiple, ill-coordinated interventions and parallel distribution systems. 
Tanzania pledges appeared to be under 20% albeit this may have failed to 
include soft loan wheat for resale. No aid to defray domestic costs of 
onshore procurement to meet ration distribution in drought hit districts 
was recorded. Angola's pledges were 78% of target but, as noted, the 
target of 85,000 tonnes gravely understated requirements especially in the 
pre-election context of growing access to previously war or mine isolated 
rural areas.
The lag from pledges to deliveries was proving much longer than 
anticipated. As of early October only 10% of total April 1992/March 1993 
pledges had arrived. Much of the 90% - including some pre-conference 
commitments - had no target arrival dates let alone firm shipment 
schedules. As a result, countries with the resources to do so had been 
forced to divert scarce foreign exchange to continuing commercial imports. 
The lag is especially serious because it means maximum attempts to move 
supplies up country will be needed during the November-March rainy season 
when many roads become nearly impassable.
On-the-ground performance, as expected, diverged markedly. Botswana, as 
anticipated, was coping effectively. Tanzania's, admittedly rough and 
ready, system was getting the food out admittedly with an inadequate work 
for food programme to use food aid and enforced 'spare' time to improve 
rural infrastructure and only at the cost of serious fiscal problems. 
Zimbabwe after a slow start had moved to distributing up to 30,000 tonnes 
of emergency aid a month to about 5,000,000 recipients - at least twice as 
much to twice as many recipients as any other programme.
Zambia - using both government and NGO channels - had performed well above 
what previous experience would have predicted and clearly was safe from 
large scale starvation. Swaziland - making creative use of domestic NGOs 
(notably its national Red Cross) was also coping well.
The countries in which the spectre of famine still stalked - indeed was 
already reaping its grim harvest of graves - were Angola and Mozambique.
Up to the election Angolan rural distribution was improving. The return to 
belligerency after UNITA rejected the election results reversed this, 
especially in the drought stricken southern provinces. In Mozambique 
competitive, ill-coordinated distribution systems and the return home of 
many deslocados, affectados and refugees after the General Peace Accord of 
early October, combined with inadequate arrivals of food aid to create 
rising levels of extreme malnutrition and death with the prospects for 
early 1993 grim. This was compounded by the inability of distribution 
systems to switch rapidly to add districts of return to the existing 
districts of refuge network - a weakness paralleled by UNHCR in relation to 
refugees. Failure to accept interim arrangements for drawing rations at 
camps (where some family members usually remain during initial re­
establishment) by families engaged in home livelihood rehabilitation has - 
to date - increased famine risks rather than deterring either domestic or 
international forced migrants from returning home.
The regional and most national logistical arrangements have worked well - 
up to a point. This is largely the result of cooperation within SADC and 
bilaterally with a key role played by Zimbabwe's Ministry of Transport.
The Beira and Dar es Salaam corridors are moving substantial volumes while 
the still not fully rehabilitated Nacala and Maputo corridors are 
functioning as are land routes from Namibia to Zambia and, until the 
October crisis, Angola. South Africa has been cooperative in liaising on
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7routings, allocation of rolling stock (including leases as far afield as 
TAZARA) and making commercial sales out of domestic stocks which it will 
itself replace by imports given its own deficit of up to 5,000,000 tonnes. 
The key problem is the lag in pledge deliveries and lack of a firm delivery 
schedule for food aid which makes proper logistical planning at and from 
ports impossible and threatens to create bottle-necks if shipments suddenly 
bunch early in 1993.
Prospects, Reflections and Reforms
The great Southern African drought of 1991/92 will not lead to the great 
Southern African famine of 1992/93. Despite severe strains, national 
emergency systems have functioned. Despite lags and low commitments the 
international response has been significant and has exorcised the spectre 
of mass deaths. There are deaths - which began as early as April, more 
then from lack of water and forced migration to seek it than from lack of 
food. Drought and forced migration through the interaction of illness and 
malnutrition leading to otherwise avoidable death will kill thousands - 
especially in Mozambique and Angola. But - even in most of rural 
Mozambique and Angola - there are no scenes like those from Somalia. 
Battered and tenuous as they are, the emergency systems in both countries 
function (and are with rare exceptions guarded, not looted, by the armed 
forces). Civil governance, however weak, exists not only in large towns 
but in the countryside areas where perhaps two thirds of the rural 
population live. To that extent the Southern African 1991/92 experience is 
a qualified success with hundreds of thousands of lives clawed back from 
the brink of the grave.
Precisely because, up to a point, it is a success it is possible to reflect 
on particular weaknesses and to posit reforms. These go far beyond the by 
now conventional wisdom that it is not drought alone, but drought in the 
context of war, which kills.
1. Emergencies should be seen as recurrent with national, regional and 
international response structures designed on that basis not on the 
assumption that calamities (notably drought but also floods in Southern 
Africa) are one-off and non-recurrent.
2. Early warning system data should be used to send out standby alerts as 
soon as a calamity is probable and to move to assessment and response
definition as soon as projected losses become severe and substantially 
irreversible. This is particularly practicable and crucial in the case 
of drought to which early response to enable households to stay on 
their farms and be ready to rehabilitate their livelihoods when the 
rains return is half the battle - a half that is all too often lost 
(even more in the Horn and the Sahel than in Southern Africa).
Emergency systems need to be nationally owned to be effective - with 
regional back-up (as by SADC) in data analysis, mobilisation and 
logistics where practicable. International support (including 
retrospective finance for bridging imports and fiscal assistance for 
on-shore procurement for free or work for food distribution) should be 
within, coordinated by and responsive to that national framework. This 
need not preclude multiple channels (including domestic civil society 
bodies and other NGOs) but external support should be primarily for 
domestic bodies and decapacitating, fragmenting, direct external agency 
operations are best seen as a last resort to be minimised whenever and 
wherever possible (as it is not at present in, e.g. Somalia, Sudan and 
Liberia).
Setting up monitoring arrangements tracking the course from pledges to 
commitments to delivery dates to arrival aimed at speeding up and 
providing accurate arrival pattern information (comparable to that in 
commercial transactions) is needed to allow proper national and 
regional management of logistics and distribution.
Food, seed and - when needed - tools should be perceived not only as 
humanitarian survival support (which they are) but also as the "working 
capital" necessary to enable calamity hit households to rehabilitate 
their livelihoods.
Work for food (or, if domestic commercial food channels are inadequate, 
food for work) programmes centring on rural infrastructure 
rehabilitation including reduction of vulnerability to future droughts 
or floods need to be pre-planned and linked to an ongoing labour 
intensive construction and maintenance programme so they can be quickly 
and efficiently brought into operation when a calamity strikes (as 
illustrated by the Botswana programme).
97. More attention should be paid to emergency water supply 
enhancement/protection including that to vulnerable urban areas during 
catastrophe response and to longer term improvements after the drought 
has passed. (Bulawayo's and Beira's extreme vulnerability had been 
known for some years).
8. In the case of reconstruction after war catastrophes (at the top of the 
agenda today in Mozambique, Ethiopia and hopefully Angola, and tomorrow 
in Somalia, Liberia and Sudan) viewing emergency and refugee support as 
the first phase of rehabilitation of livelihoods and planning ahead for 
their transmutation into strategies to enable households to re­
establish themselves with access to supporting basic services, 
infrastructure and commercial networks is needed if peace is to lead on 
to rapid gains for forced migrants (who comprise half the total 
populations of Mozambique and Angola).
A massive tragedy has - barely - been averted in Southern Africa. But 
lives have been lost which could have been saved and suffering as well as 
forced migration have been unacceptably and unnecessarily high. Euphoria 
or relaxation (if the 1992/93 rains prove normal or better) would be an 
inappropriate and imprudent response. Rather the opportunity should be 
taken for a thorough process of reflection on, and reform of, national, 
regional and international catastrophe and calamity emergency response and 
post emergency rehabilitation perceptions, processes and institutions.
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TABLE 1 
FAQ/WFP MISSION ESTIMATES 
(April Assessment)
Grain Production Import Requirements® Food Aid Requirements Coomercial Imports
(tonnes) (tonnes) (tonnes) (tonnes)
Of Which
1987/1991 Auq.1 1992 % Normal Grain Other® Grain7 Other Emergency" Grain10 Other*
Southern Africa
Zimbabwe 2,335,000 608,000 26 1,410,000 ( 75,000) 660,000 38,200 509,000 750,000 ( 36,800)
Mozambique 550,000a 226,000 41 1,381,000 (150,000) 1,303,000 101,000 688,000 78,000 ( 49,000)
Malawi 1,485,000 683,000 46 876,000 ( 75,000) 740,000 38,000 438,000 136,000 ( 37,000)
Zambia 1,600,000 572,000 36 970,000 ( 30,000) 820,000 15,000 109,000® 150,000 ( 15,000)
Tanzania 3,825,000 3,,250,000 85 500,000 ( 10,000) 280,000 1,500 16,000® 220,000 ( 8,500)
Lesotho 172,500 81,000 47 297,000 ( 20,000) 75,000 3,000 78,000 222,000 ( 17,000)
Swaziland 140,000 53,000 38 129,000 ( 15,000) 60,000 5,500 47,000 69,000 ( 9,500)
Botswana 59,000 15,000 24 240,000 ( 50,000) 15,000 1,700 17,000® 225,000 ( 48,300)
Namibia 110,000 33,000 30 125,000 ( 35,000) 60,000 1,350 61,000 65,000 ( 33,650)
Angola 317,000* 454,000 143 285,000“ ( 70,000) 125,000“ 20,000 136,000 160,000 ( 50,000)
(Sub Total) 10,600,000* 5,,975,000 563 6,213,000 (530,000) 4,138,000 225,000 1,967,000 2,075,000 (305,000)
(Excluding Tanzania
and Angola 6,450,000 2,275,000 35
South Africa 12,150,000 3,650,000 30 5,500,000 - - - -
Total 22,750,000* 9,625,000 42* 11,713,000 (530,000) 4,138,000 225,000 1,967,000 2,075,000 (305,000)
Source: Adapted from FAO/WFP March-April 1992, Mission To Southern Africa.
Notes:
1. In general 1986/87, 1987/88 and 1988/89 were good crop years with 1989/90 and 1990/91 poor. However, there has been substantial inter and intra 
country divergence within this trend. Country figures computed from Mission 1992 crop and % of normal data.
2. War has both depressed output and hampered estimation of volume grown. Total production estimates appear to be too low but changes may be less so.
3. Sum total of country data from, or computed from. Mission Report. Mission implicit regional total crop figures are higher and, therefore, % of
normal presented in report is lower than the total of their country data.
4. Implausibly low. Angola's recent past crop levels like Mozambiques have been war (and insurgent tactics) devastated. Institutional and transport
barriers - as well as financial - have limited past emergency assistance distribution to very low levels and imposed severe hunger constraints on 
isolated inland cities and towns. With the relaxation of the war, transport and to a degree institutional constraints the needed (for minimally 
adequate nutrition) imports required are probably on the order of 450,000 to 500,000 tonnes of food aid 275,000 to 350,000 tonnes and of emergency 
programme distribution 125,000 to 175,000 tonnes.
5. Net national territorial requirement (including resident refugees) excluding imports to replace regional exports (South Africa) and transit traffic 
to landlocked states (Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa).
6. Rough estimate. Only direct emergency food aid requirement directly available from Mission Report.
7. In principle includes all amounts already pledged. In practice appears to exclude wheat imports which are de facto aid financed in Tanzania, Zambia
Zimbabwe totalling perhaps 250,000 tonnes and up to 25,000 tonnes similarly financed rice imports in Tanzania.
8. For free ration, food for work, work for food and/or special project distribution. Includes grain and other.
9. Implausibly low. At least in cases of Tanzania and Botswana appears to exclude nationally organised free food ration distribution to severely
drought (or flood) affected districts. Given the number of displaced persons in Angola a more plausible estimate would be of the order of 150,000
tonnes.
10. By subtraction Food Aid Requirement from Import Requirement. Inadequate estimates of local cross border imports and exports except for Zambia to
Zaire.
TABLE 2
'NORMAL' AND POST DROUGHT FOOD ’BALANCE' POSITION 
(TONNES GRAIN EQUIVALENT)
Basic Requirement1
Domestic Production 
Urban (Zonas Verdes) 
Household Consumed 
Commercialised
Rural
Household Consumed 
Commercialised - 
Formal and Informal
Imports
Food Aid
Commercial/Parallel 
Food Deficit
1991/1992
4.500.000 (100%)
2.750.000 (62%)
150,000 (3%)
(50,000) (1%)
(10 0,0 0 0 ) (2%)
2.600.000 (59%)
(2,100,000) (48%)
(500.000) (11%)
625,0002 (13%)
(500.00 0) (11%)
(125.000) (2%)
1.125.000 (25%)
1992/19935
4.500.000 (100%)
2.060.000 (46%)
110,000 (2%)
(40.000) (1%)
(70.000) (1%)
1.950.000 (44%)
(1,700,000) (39%)
(250.000) (5%)
(525.000) (12%)
(500.000) (11%)
(50.000) (1%)
1.915.000 (43%)
Urban/Rural Breakdown
Basic Requirement3
Domestic Production 
Urban 
Rural
Household Consumed 
Commercialised
Imports2
Food Deficit
Urban
1,080,000
550.000
(150.000)
(400.000)
(50,000)
(500.000)
400.000
(130.000) (12%)
Rural
3.420.000
2.200.000 
( - )
(2 ,200,000)
(2,100,000)
(100,000)
Urban
1,080,000
310,000
(11 0 ,00 0 )
(200,000)
(40,000)
(270,000)
Rural
3.420.000
1.750.000
( - )
(1.750.000)
(1.700.000)
(50,000)
225.000 (400,000) (125,000)
995.000 (29%)“ 370,000 (36%)ft 1,545,000 (45%)*
1 Based on 12,500,000 population estimate.
2 Probably understates total imports for 1991/92. May be 125,000 tonnes additional boarder
imports from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi consumed in adjoining rural districts 
or nearby towns. Transborder exports to Malawi and Tanzania - not estimated - may be up to
50,000 tonnes. These are from areas - e.g. Angonia, Northern Mueda Plateau with poor 
transport links with the rest of Mozambique.
3 Based on 3,000,000 urban and 9,500,000 rural.
4 Intuitively 29% - borderline famine level - appears slightly too high (61% of basic
nutritional need average availability too low). 125,000 tonnes of underestimated border 
area imports consumed in rural areas or reducing the actual Mozambican sources sales to 
towns would lower it to the 26% level which seems plausible.
5 Before additional food aid pledges.
6 After additional food aid the actual urban deficit will be substantially lower. The rural 
will be lower but many will be nearly 40%.
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CTonnes /  $ )a
Imports
FOOD2 
(tonnes)
Food Aid3
OTHER REQUIREMENTS AND SOURCES3 
($)
Grain Other
Staple
Emergency3 Other Pledged5
Pre-Drought
Gap* Transport/
Distribution"7
Water/Camps/ 
Work Programmes"
Pledged
Pre-Drought
Additional
Monetisation*
Gap10
Zimbabwe11 1,410,000 75,000 509,000 300,000 75,000 734,000 60,000,000 60,000,000 5,000,000 15,000,000 100,000,000
Mozambique 1,381,000 150,000 688,000 615,000 600,000 703,000 100,000,000 60,000,000 30,000,000 5,000,000 125,000,000
Malawi 876,000 75,000 438,000 337,000 350,000 425,000 60,000,000 20,000,000 20,000,000 10,000,000 50,000,000
Zambia12 970,000 30,000 209,000 670,000 100,000 779,000 40,000,000 20,000,000 5,000,000 20,000,000 35,000,000
Tanzania12 500,000 10,000 116,000 300,000 50,000 366,000 25,000,000 15,000,000 5,000,000 7,500,000 27,500,000
Lesotho 297,000 20,000 78,000 100,000 30,000 148,000 7,500,000 10,000,000 7,500,000 2,500,000 7,500,000
Swaziland 129,000 15,000 47,000 19,000 5,000 61,000 3,000,000 2,500,000 1,000,000 500,000 4,000,000
Botswana13 240,000 50,000 17,000 - 2,000 15,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 negl. negl. 4,000,000
Namibia 125,000 35,000 61,000 39,000 15,000 85,000 7,000,000 8,000,000 2,500,000 500,000 12,000,000
Angola13 500,000 70,000 150,000 50,000 50,000 250,000 35,000,000 35,000,000 5,000,000 8,000,000 57,000,000
Total
Southern Africa 6 428,000 530,000 2,313,000 2,530,000 1,277,000 3,566,000 339,500,000 232,500,000 81,000,000 54,000,000 437,000,000
Sources: FAO/WFP Mission Report, "Tocsin", National Data
Notes:
1. Totals include baseline (pre-drought) and drought requirements.
2. Adjusted from Mission data for Angola and by Inclusion of Other Staple Food (beans, legumes, vegetable, oil, sugar) in Imports as well as Emergency Food
Aid Totals.
3. Adjusted to include estimates of all national free and food for work/work for food programming, except in the case of Botswana where part will be covered 
by commercial imports.
4. Includes food financed from general balance of payments support and concessional loan arrangements (especially for wheat and, secondarily rice) 
apparently excluded in Report. Adjusted upward in cases in which commercial import residual in Report's Table 1 (Table 2 above) appears unattainably 
high.
5. Rough estimate - broadly similar to 1990/91 deliveries.
6. Stated in tonnes because donor accounting prices for food and transport tend to be on average 25% to 50% above commercial import parity.
7. Average of $100 tonne for emergency and $25 tonne for non-emergency (basically monetised) food aid. Substantially higher in Mozambique and Angola.
8. Rough estimates because water shortage alleviation costs are not fully articulated and importance of drought displaced person camps (i.e. inability to
meet food and water needs in home area), food for work/work for food and water supply security enhancing needs vary sharply by country.
9. Calculated on non-emergency portion of gap (assuming pre-drought pledged aid counterpart elements have already been allocated). Rough estimate of $50
per tonne on account of built in 180 day lag in most states because credit ceilings prevent wholesaler using overdraft increase to buy on a cash basis.
Given collection experience (lags and leakages) this may an overestimate.
10. Fiscal gap arising from enhanced drought impact mitigation programme.
11. Zimbabwe's national 2,200,000 import requirement estimate covers 18 months with, of the order of 150,000 tonnes prior to and some 450,000 outside the 
1992/93 period. The remaining apparent 200,000 tonne divergence seems to relate to divergence on minimum acceptable stocks to cover the time to a 
delayed harvest (or the time to mobilise aid) in drought disaster years. Increased aid estimate because Zimbabwe's external account and fiscal position 
are far too fragile to carry projected level of commercial imports and domestic financing.
12. Emergency requirement adjusted upward (within unchanged total). Mission figures below minimum Zambian rural relief requirements and 'normal'
Tanzanian drought year District ration distribution levels.
13. Emergency figure may be correct in terms of external assistance sought. However, in that case it would seem that 50% or more of food will be provided
by government out of commercial imports and general budget revenues. In the Botswana case this is perfectly practicable.
14. Import, aid, emergency figures all adjusted upward. Conclusion of war and some reallocation of personnel plus transport make much larger rural food 
distribution possible. Inability to deliver not lack of need has explained very low Angola imports relative to Mozambique.
Source Note:
This article draws on FAO/WFP, SADC and SCF reports on crop prospects, the 
FAO/WFP April 1992 Mission Report on Southern Africa and discussions with 
numerous UNICEF, UNDP and national officials. Some aspects have been 
covered in more detail in the author's "Sound The Tocsin; The Third 
Horseman Mounts To Ride: Drought In Southern And South Africa 1991-1993", 
IDS (Sussex) 1992; "Southern Africa: That The People May Be Fed: Tocsin 
through pledges and paper to transportation and distribution" in Food 
Policy, forthcoming; Signs Of Hope: Towards Rehabilitation and Renewed 
Development for the Children of Southern Africa (with R. Morgan and 
C. Davids), UNICEF, 1992; "Toward More Life Sustaining Calamity And 
Catastrophe Alleviation And Rehabilitation Action By The UN Extended 
Family", IDS (Sussex) 1992 and The Four Horsemen Ride Together: Scorched 
Fields Of War In Southern Africa, Refugee Studies Programme, Queen 
Elizabeth House, Oxford, 1993.
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